

2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Summer School on Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies

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# **Introduction to Hydrogen Safety Engineering**

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# Public perception

The 1937 Hindenburg dirigible disaster




No explosion

# Why hydrogen?

- **Fossil Fuel Reserves** (Proven reserves based on current production; source: World Coal Institute):
  - **Coal: 200 years**
  - **Gas: 70 years**
  - **Oil: 40 years**
- **Geopolitical fears:** fossil fuel depletion, potential wars
- **Independence of energy supply**
- **Environment pollution:** green hydrogen (zero emission): renewable energy (wind, tide, solar, hydro) – hydrogen storage – fuel cells – vehicles, stationary and portable applications
- **Climate change**
- **Global market is projected to be \$8.5B by 2016.**

# Space shuttle Challenger disaster (1986)



# Silver Eagle Refinery (2009)

- At 9:11 am on November 4, 2009, the refinery experienced a catastrophic failure of a **25 cm pipe** off the bottom of a reactor in the Mobil Distillate Dewaxing Unit.
- At the time, the unit was undergoing a special operation to regenerate the catalyst. This operation involved circulating **high-pressure hydrogen** inside the piping, at a temperature of 800 F and a pressure of **43 bar**.
- There's a release and almost instantaneously the gas ignites in large fireball estimate to be **35 m high**.
- The damage from the explosion in the residential neighborhood east of the facility.
- Clearly this explosion had the potential to cause deaths or serious injuries had it occurred even a few moments earlier or later in the day. There were 4 workers near the process unit at the time of the explosion. They were blown to the ground. Another worker had been taking readings next to the pipe that failed just 1-2 minutes before the release.

# Silver Eagle Refinery (2009)





# Fukushima nuclear plant (2011)




# Hydrogen safety

- ❖ Hydrogen safety studies were initiated decades ago - result of accidents in the process industries, and were supported by safety research for nuclear power and aerospace sector.
- ❖ However, the Challenger Space Shuttle (2007) and the Fukushima nuclear (2011) tragedies demonstrated that our knowledge and engineering skills to deal with hydrogen require more investment both intellectual and financial.
- ❖ Hydrogen is getting out of hands of trained professionals in industry and become everyday activity for public (700 bar). This implies **a new safety culture**, innovative safety strategies, breakthrough engineering solutions.
- ❖ It is expected that the level of safety at the consumer interface with hydrogen must be similar or exceeds that present with fossil fuel usage.
- ❖ Safety parameters of hydrogen and fuel cell products will directly define their competitiveness on the market.



# Scope of hydrogen safety engineering

**HSE:** application of scientific and engineering principles to the protection of life, property and environment from adverse effects of incidents involving hydrogen.




**World's first MSc in Hydrogen Safety Engineering**

<http://www.ulster.ac.uk/elearning/programmes/view/course/10139>

# Early “propaganda”

Hydrogen jet fire and gasoline fire: 3 and 60 seconds after car fire initiation



# Coming soon...?

## HFC Vehicle gasoline pool fire test

**Just before PRD initiation**



**1 s after PRD initiation**



**10 m fireball**

# Coming soon...?

The HFCV with initiated PRD (on the left) and the gasoline car (on the right)



No safeguarding by first responders?

# External fire tests to initiate PRD

a

Light oil pool fire



b

Cedar wood flame



c

Propane burner



d

Vehicle fire





# Upward release from current PRD

Vehicle equipped with two 34 L capacity cylinders at 350 bar and “normal” PRD.

**Back view**



**Side view**



**Do we accept 10-15 m flame from a car?  
No harm distance is 25-40 m (plus jet noise)!**

# Downwards release from PRD

Fire was initiated on the instrumentation panel ashtrays. The PRD was actuated 14 min 36 s (upward scenario ) and 16 min and 16 s (downward).  
**Blowdown < 5 min (no tank failure, but...).**

**Back view**



**Side view**



**...what if this car is indoor?**

# Barriers (free jet 16.5 kPa)








# Barrier 60°: 9.5 mm, 800 ms (57 kPa)



# High pressure electrolysers


Cell failure mechanism at pressures above 50 bar is under investigation by French-Russian group.






# 400 bar electrolyser (Japan)

**Titanium** electrolyser before and after the combustion in oxygen




# 400 bar electrolyser (Japan)

**Titanium** electrolyser materials (fluorine from the membrane) were dispersed into surroundings: car windshield before and after (few days) the accident




# Permeation (1/2)

**CFD: negligible stratification  
(no areas of 100% hydrogen)**



**Max concentration at 133 min:**  
tank top -  $8.2 \times 10^{-3}$  % by vol.;  
ceiling -  $3.5 \times 10^{-3}$  % by vol.



# Permeation (2/2)

- ❖ Thus, **with homogeneously dispersed permeated hydrogen**, at reasonable minimum natural ventilation rate of 0.03 ACH, at reasonable maximum prolonged material temperature of 55°C (test temperature factor 4.7 for 15°C), with aging factor 2, the maximum hydrogen concentration will not be above 1% by vol if **permeation rate for new tank is below 6 NmL/hr/L (15°C), or 8 NmL/hr/L (20°C).**

For comparison:

- ❖ JARI: **5 NmL/hr/L (15°C).**
- ❖ SAE J2579, end of life, 55°C: **150 NmL/min/vehicle**  
(HySafe equivalent figure would be **90 NmL/min/vehicle**)
- ❖ ISO/TS15869:2009 at end of life (20°C): **75 NmL/min/container**
- ❖ **Commission Regulation (EU) No 406/2010 of 26 April 2010 implementing Regulation (EC) No 79/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on type-approval of hydrogen-powered motor vehicles:**  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:122:SOM:EN:HTML>



# CFD – contemporary tool for HSE

UU simulation of UNIPi experiment  
H<sub>2</sub> release in a fuel cell

## Scenario A:

H<sub>2</sub> flow rate 40 NL/min

H<sub>2</sub> release duration 1200 s


H<sub>2</sub> concentration profiles: 0.5%, 2%, 4%



# Indoor: pressure peaking phenomenon!

Small garage LxWxH=4.5x2.6x2.6 m (“brick” vent).




Mass flow rate 390 g/s (H<sub>2</sub>: 350 bar, 5.08 mm orifice).




**Solution: decrease PRD orifice size and increase fire resistance of onboard storage**

# Microflames: tests and CFD

- **Hazard:** the small leak burns undetected for a long period, damaging the containment system and providing an ignition source.
- **Left flame:** hydrogen downward into air ( $3.9 \mu\text{g/s}$ ,  $0.46 \text{ W}$ ). ID=0.15 mm. Exposure 30 s.
- **SAE J2600 permits** hydrogen leak rates below  $200 \text{ mL/hr}$  ( $0.46 \mu\text{g/s}$ ) – no flame!




# Quenching and blow-off limits







## Dependence on tube diameter

# The open atmosphere – 10 kPa (1/2)




# The open atmosphere – 10 kPa (2/2)

## Hemisphere 10 m diameter (Fraunhofer ICT)





# Experiment SRI: open atmosphere



Groethe, M., et al. 1st ICHS: 30% hydrogen-air ( $D_{CJ}=1980$  m/s,  $H_c=3.2$  MJ/kg) in polyethylene balloon of radius  $R=5.23$  m; Direct initiation; Blast wave overpressure was recorded at the radius  $R=15.6$  m and the corresponding blast wave impulse was calculated.

# LPG car (pressure activated PRD)




**T-activated PRD for hydrogen vehicles**

# Bonfire test (CNG, no PRD)



# Bonfire test: Type 4 tank (no PRD)



**“Fire resistance” is 1-6 minutes.**

**No combustion contribution to the blast.**



# “Unsafe” (misleading) statements


- ❖ (-) **Sunavala, Hulse, Thring, 1957**: “Calculated flame length may be obtained by substitution the concentration corresponding to the **stoichiometric** mixture (29.5% of H<sub>2</sub> in air) in equation of axial concentration decay for non-reacting jet”
- ❖ (-) **Bilger and Beck, 1975**: flame length is defined “for convenience” as the length on the axis to the point having a mean composition which is **stoichiometric** (H<sub>2</sub> concentration is twice of O<sub>2</sub>).
- ❖ (-) **Bilger, 1976**: the calculated flame length may be obtained by substitution the concentration corresponding to the **stoichiometric** mixture in the equation of axial concentration decay for a non-reacting jet.



# Where is a jet flame tip location?

❖ Flammable envelope = 4% v/v (LFL)

❖ Flame tip location = 11% v/v in unignited jet (8-16%)




Flame is from 2.2 times (16%) to 4.7 times (8%) longer than the distance to axial concentration 29.5% (stoichiometric hydrogen-air mixture).!

# Plane jets (cracks, flanges)

**Round jet**  $\frac{C_{ax}}{C_N} = 5.4 \sqrt{\frac{\rho_N}{\rho_S}} \frac{D}{x}$

**Plane 2D jet**  $\frac{C_{ax}}{C_N} = 2.13 \sqrt{\frac{\rho_N}{\rho_S}} \sqrt{\frac{D}{x}}$

## The switch-of-axes phenomenon



How it decays compared to axisymmetric jets?

# Innovative PRD1 (350 bar)



**Flame length reduction: 7.5 → 1.8 m**



# Innovative PRD2 (350 bar)




**Flame length reduction: 6.1 → 1.8 m**



# Innovative short flame PRD

**Current PRD**

**Back view**



**Short flame PRD**

**Current PRD**

**Side view**



**Short flame PRD**



**MSc in Hydrogen Safety Engineering (distance learning course):**  
<http://www.ulster.ac.uk/elearning/programmes/view/course/10139>